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Abstract 
The efficiency of tax systems is an important topic for policy makers and academics. We focus 
on the efficiency of applying VAT to traditional banking services, a significant issue where a 
consensus has yet to be reached since the first debates more than two decades ago. This paper 
discusses one of the most relevant models of tax efficiency on banking services under VAT, 
the model developed by Jack (2000). This author shows that explicit fees and commissions 
should be taxable under VAT, while implicit fees covered by banking spreads should be zero-
rated. An alternative theoretical approach is developed in this paper, proposing the taxation of 
both explicit and implicit fees of financial services under VAT at the same tax rate, which 
should also be the same rate applied to all other goods and services. 
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The efficient taxation of traditional banking services (savings and loans) under VAT has been 
discussed for over two decades without reaching a consensus. Value added tax (VAT) has been 
implemented in more than 150 countries since the 1960s. However, in most countries, financial 
services are exempt from VAT. López-Laborda and Peña (2017, 2018) review the main argu-
ments for the exemption. Some economists suggest that taxation of intermediation charges (fees 
and commissions) could lead to double taxation of savings, but they are considering financial 
charges as part of savings, not consumption. Another argument is the difficulty in observing or 
measuring these charges. Finally, even if observable, there is a factual barrier on the accurate 
allocation of these charges among consumers. These two last reasons are what make this type 
of taxation so complex.  
Nonetheless, the exemption of financial services from VAT leads to many distortions, as 
López-Laborda and Peña (2017) show. One issue is that VAT on purchases by financial com-
panies cannot be recovered, which breaks the VAT chain, and leads to tax cascading because 
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companies add this amount to the final price, directly impacting customers. Even taking into 
account tax incidence, this fact may lead to over-taxation of business customers but under-
taxation of households, because they do not pay any explicit tax for consuming financial ser-
vices, despite the higher price due to tax cascading. There are also incentives to outsourcing or 
vertical integration in order to avoid irrecoverable input VAT. Exemption also entails compli-
ance costs, because distinguishing between exempt and non-exempt transactions makes taxa-
tion more complex and generates problems of interpretation when determining the scope of the 
exemption and calculating the amount of the recoverable and irrecoverable input VAT. Finally, 
exemption has negative effects on tax revenue, income distribution, tax avoidance, and eco-
nomic stability (IMF, 2010).  
These distortions have encouraged in-depth discussion among academicians in search of the 
most accurate method for taxing financial services under VAT. A central issue in this debate is 
which charges on banking services should be taxed and what their tax rate should be. Jack 
(2000) develops an inter-temporal consumption model, in which he shows that while explicit 
charges should be taxed, the taxation of implicit fees would distort the inter-temporal relative 
prices.  
In this paper, we develop an alternative theoretical approach to that of Jack (2000), concluding 
that both explicit fees and commissions and banking spreads should be taxed, applying the same 
tax rate to all banking and real consumption. 
The paper is organized as follows. The second section presents the model developed by Jack 
(2000), while the third section proposes an alternative model as an attempt to improve on the 
previous one. Finally, the fourth section provides the main conclusions. 
 
2. The taxation of explicit and implicit commissions under VAT:  
The approach of Jack (2000) 
While most academicians suggested fully taxing all banking charges of financial services (Hoff-
man, Poddar and Whalley, 1987; Gillis, 1990; English and Poddar, 1997), there was no defini-
tive analytical model analyzing this issue and explicitly considering banking services as output 
for households in the model. In fact, Auerbach and Gordon (2002) analytically show that the 
presumption about “all primary inputs that enter into the production of a good should be taxed” 
is right even for financial services. They consider an explicit treatment of the costs of financial 
transactions. This financial transaction is an input for a business producing real goods, but not 
a good by itself. Hence, we observe that they may not explicitly consider banking services as 
final consumer goods, at least as far as we will aim to do. Even if Auerbach and Gordon (2002) 
considered financial services as final goods, they only explicitly consider real resources as real 
costs of conserving bank branches or ATM machines. It seems that they implicitly ignore the 
presence of non-real inputs as liquidity, safety or others that allow the establishment of some 
financial services as those Internet-based in which there are insignificant, or almost none, real 
inputs per financial good, but where there is significant value added generated. 
Auerbach and Gordon (2002) show the equivalence between an income and consumption tax. 
The Financial Activities Tax (FAT) taxes the value added of financial services by levying the 
sum of profits and remuneration paid by financial institutions. So, income is taxed without 
looking for the difficult separation between implicit margin and capital income. As Keen, Kre-
love and Norregaard (2016) state, one of its versions is similar to an addition-based value added 
tax (VAT). Nonetheless, it is not compatible with a credit-voice VAT, maintaining an exemp-
tion that, as Mirrlees state, breaks the VAT chain. 
In the context of the USA, where VAT does not apply, Jack (2000) developed a simple two-
period model with consumption dealing with the taxation of financial services under a broad-
based consumption tax. While he considered several types of financial services (banking, in-
surance, investment funds, etc.), here we focus on traditional banking transactions. We prefer 
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to base our model in Jack (2000) instead of Auerbach and Gordon (2002) because, first, the 
former explicitly treats the implicit margin of banking services. Second, because the latter treat 
explicitly real inputs but not, as far as we know, the non-real, nonetheless, the former allows us 
to consider the non-real inputs as part of the implicit margin. At Jack’s model, consumption in 
period i is denoted by ci, i = 1, 2. The purchasing price of good i is pi, including all searching 
costs which the individual could incur. Consumers are net savers, because they receive an ex-
ogenous income w in period 1, but income in period 2 is zero, and the consumers deposit their 
funds with a bank, earning an interest rate free of charge and risk (or “pure” interest) ε (denoted 
by r in Jack’s terminology). In a scenario of costless banking, the inter-temporal budget con-




𝑐2 = 𝑤 (1) 
Next, Jack (2000) considers that the transformation of the consumption of the first period on 
consumption of the second period requires the use of costly banking inputs. The author consid-
ers three kinds of costs. For each of those costs, banks apply a distinct charge. There are certain 
fixed costs linked to banking services, related to opening accounts and maintaining costs. For 
these costs banks apply a fixed fee F such as annual credit card and account opening fees. There 
are also convenience components denominated quasi-fixed costs, which are proportional to the 
volume of transactions, and allow individuals to make payments automatically, or to economize 
on cash holdings. They are charged through a quasi-fixed fee ϕ, covering charges such as fees 
on ATM transactions and bank checks. Finally, there are some proportional costs on the nomi-
nal value of the inter-temporal transfer, which represents the bank’s loan portfolio not expected 
to perform or resources devoted to monitoring and supervising larger loans, or marketing to 
larger depositors. These costs are levied with a proportional fee σ, identified as the margin or 
spread of deposits, which is proportional to the nominal value of the deposit funds.  
In this scenario with costly banking, the inter-temporal budget constraint is as follows: 
(𝑝'1 + 𝜙)𝑐1 +
(𝑝'2 + 𝜙)
(1 + − 𝜎)
𝑐2 = 𝑤 −
𝐹𝛿
(1 + − 𝜎)
 (2) 
Where p´i is the gross price of the good in the period i reduced by banking services included as 
a convenience component, for which the financial entity establishes an explicit commission ϕ. 
The term δ=0 if c2=0 and δ>0 if c2>0. 
So, the relative price of a good in period 2 with respect to a good in period 1 would be: 
?̃?0 =
(𝑝'2 + 𝜙)
(𝑝'1 +𝜙)(1 + − 𝜎)
 (3) 
If a tax rate τ is applied to the purchasing price of goods of the first and second period, we have: 
?̃?1 =
((1 + 𝜏)𝑝'2 + 𝜙)
((1 + 𝜏)𝑝'1 +𝜙)(1 + − 𝜎)
 (4) 
Relative price has changed with respect to the baseline scenario [2]: 
?̃?0 ≠ ?̃?1 (5) 
Applying the same tax rate to the price of the goods and to the explicit commission, we obtain: 
?̃?2 =
((1 + 𝜏)𝑝'2 + (1 + 𝜏)𝜙)
((1 + 𝜏)𝑝'1 + (1 + 𝜏)𝜙)(1 + − 𝜎)
 (6) 
This is a neutral tax policy because there is no alteration on inter-temporal relative price: 
?̃?0 = ?̃?2 (7) 
If the financial margin were also taxed, we obtain: 
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?̃?3 =
((1 + 𝜏)𝑝'2 + (1 + 𝜏)𝜙)
((1 + 𝜏)𝑝'1 + (1 + 𝜏)𝜙)(1 + − (1 + 𝜏)𝜎)
 (8) 
So, in this model, deposit spreads should not be levied under VAT, because this distorts inter-
temporal price: 
?̃?3 > ?̃?0 (9) 
Another interesting question to consider would be the desirability of taxing explicit fees for 
financial services at the same tax rate as real consumption, which is implicit in Jack’s approach, 
but which we explicitly express by separating in [6] the tax rate for financial services (τF), from 
the rate of real consumption (τR). 
?̃?4 =
((1 + 𝜏𝑅)𝑝'2 + (1 + 𝜏𝐹)𝜙)
((1 + 𝜏𝑅)𝑝'1 + (1 + 𝜏𝐹)𝜙)(1 + − 𝜎)
 (10) 
If τR= τF, then ?̃?4 ≠ ?̃?0. Therefore, the tax rate on explicit fees and commissions should be the 
same as on real goods and services.1 
This section provides two main conclusions from Jack’s model. First, explicit fees and com-
missions should be taxed at the same tax rate as non-financial consumption. Second, banking 
spreads should not be taxed. 
 
3. An alternative theoretical specification 
In Jack’s approach, implicit fees for financial services are not considered financial consump-
tion. Nonetheless, in this paper we propose implicit margins to be considered as part of financial 
consumption. Without banking charges, consumers only save and consume real goods and ser-
vices, but with costly banking, final households have to renounce some real consumption in 
order to consume financial services, which allow them to save. So, consumers cut back part of 
their potential spending on real goods and services to reallocate money to financial consump-
tion, represented by fixed and quasi-fixed fees, and also banking spreads. This financial con-
sumption allows the household to save.   
We can write the budget constraints of period 1 and 2, respectively, as follows: 
𝑤 = 𝑝'1𝑐1 + 𝑠1 
𝑠1(1 + ) = 𝑝'2𝑐2 + 𝜎𝑝'2𝑐2 + 𝜙𝑐2 + 𝐹𝛿 
(11) 
Where savings from the first period s1, capitalized for the second period, are equal to the real 
consumption of the second period p’2c2, and this consumption is reduced due to the financial 
consumption, which is equal to the spread charge (σp’2c2), which would also include the value 
of non-real inputs as the satisfaction of safety and liquidity needs, the quasi-fixed fee (ϕc2), and 
the fixed fee (Fδ). In this implicit fee non-real inputs as security or money availability could be 
incorporated, in contrast to Jack (2000) or Auerbach and Gordon (2002), who do not explicitly 
consider non-real inputs. Hence, the implicit margin is considered as financial consumption and 
reduces the total amount of real consumption proportionally to the spread. The reason is that 
some part of the household’s budget constraint is used to pay the financial services as final 
goods, which reduces their purchase power of other final goods as real consumption. Based on 
[11], we can re-write the inter-temporal budget constraint obtained by Jack (2000) in [2] as 
follows: 
(𝑝'1 +𝜙)𝑐1 +
((1 + 𝜎)𝑝'2 +𝜙)
(1 + )





1 Recently, Lockwood and Yerushalmi (2014) suggest that taxing transaction services provided by banks at the 
same tax rate as consumption is an optimal structure, but only when cash is not available, because if cash is avail-
able, a cash transaction could distort the choice of the means of payment.  
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The inter-temporal relative price, denoted in the same way as the previous section, but with 
an asterisk, would be: 
?̃?0* =
((1 + 𝜎)𝑝'2 + 𝜙)
(𝑝'1 +𝜙)(1 + )
 (13) 
Applying VAT only to real consumption would lead to the following relative price: 
?̃?1* =
((1 + 𝜏 + 𝜎)𝑝'2 +𝜙)
((1 + 𝜏)𝑝'1 +𝜙)(1 + )
 (14) 
Where ?̃?0* ≠ ?̃?1*. 
If VAT is applied to real consumption and explicit fees and commissions, it leads to: 
?̃?2* =
((1 + 𝜏 + 𝜎)𝑝'2 + (1 + 𝜏)𝜙)
((1 + 𝜏)𝑝'1 + (1 + 𝜏)𝜙)(1 + )
 (15) 
Unlike Jack’s model, in this scenario: 
?̃?0* ≠ ?̃?2* (16) 
Nonetheless, applying VAT to all (explicit and implicit) charges from banks, at the same tax 
rate as the rest of goods: 
?̃?3* =
(1 + 𝜏)(1 + 𝜎)𝑝'2 + (1 + 𝜏)𝜙
((1 + 𝜏)𝑝'1 + (1 + 𝜏)𝜙)(1 + )
 (17) 
Fulfilling: 
?̃?0* = ?̃?3* (18) 
Considering a different tax rate for real and financial consumption, we obtain: 
?̃?4* =
((1 + 𝜏𝑅 + (1 + 𝜏𝐹)𝜎𝑅)𝑝'2 + (1 + 𝜏𝐹)𝜙)
((1 + 𝜏𝑅)𝑝'1 + (1 + 𝜏𝐹)𝜙)(1 + )
 (19) 
Which fulfills ?̃?0* = ?̃?4* if, and only if, 𝜏𝑅 = 𝜏𝐹 . 
Therefore, according to the proposed approach, all fees and commissions charged by financial 
institutions on banking services, both explicit and implicit as spreads, should be taxed under 
VAT, and the tax rate should be the same as that applied to other goods and services. This 
would be a first best for the economy, but currently many countries already tax financial insti-
tutions by levying labor and capital income, but no VAT is applied to these services. Therefore, 
there could be a double taxation if banking services were taxed on VAT. In spite of that, the 
rest of sectors also suffer from a double taxation (capital and labor incomes are levied together 
with the value added, e.g. the Corporate Income Tax). Hence, treating the financial sector dif-
ferently (without double taxation) from the other sectors (double taxed) would distort the econ-
omy, presumably generating more inefficiencies than with this second best that allows a general 
double taxation for all sectors in a similar, not distortionary, way. The first best would be, ob-
viously, taxing all sectors with income or value added taxes as Auerbach and Gordon (2002) 
suggest. 
Another suggestion of our model is the fact that there could be value added in banking services 
without necessarily incurring in real costs. The best example, we think, is the value added gen-
erated by some Internet-based financial services, where real resources used in the production 
of the services are almost insignificant but value added is generated. Hence, we attribute this 
value added to the satisfaction of intangible needs of the consumers as security in the accounts, 
the immediacy and availability of money or the need of maintaining a specific purchase power 
that cash does not allow, which can be considered non-real or financial inputs. 
Finally, it is worth to mention that the satisfaction of these needs leads consumers to reduce 
their budget constraint, and hence, to reduce the potential purchases of real goods and services 
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in order to pay for the banking services. This payment would be the price of these banking 
services, which would be the value-added generated by the financial sector for each transaction. 
This value added is, according to the Cash-Flow method developed by English and Poddar 
(1997), the difference between the interest without fees and commissions (pure interest) and 
the saving interests, for savings, and the difference between the lending interest and the pure 
interest, for loans. Nonetheless, in a multi-activity complex financial sector it could be difficult 
to differentiate among the implicit margin for each transaction, or even between traditional 
banking spreads from the total spread.  
 
4. Concluding remarks 
The issue of the taxation of the value added of banking services under VAT is a key issue for 
the efficiency of the tax system. This topic has generated a great deal of debate for more than 
two decades, as less distorting methods of taxation are sought, but there is still no consensus. 
Auerbach and Gordon (2002) analytically show that all primary inputs included for producing 
a good should be taxed, which is right even for financial services. They explicitly treat the costs 
of financial transactions but only considering real inputs, not non-real inputs as safety or liquid-
ity.  Jack (2000) developed a model suggesting banking spreads should not be taxed, but explicit 
fees should be taxed at the same tax rate as the rest of goods and services. We propose an 
alternative model in which all banking charges of traditional saving-lending services, both 
spreads and explicit, should be taxed under VAT at the same tax rate as real consumption Our 
proposal could also consider non-real inputs and therefore Internet-based banking services with 
irrelevant real inputs. 
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